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1 Introduction
Recently, the United States have implemented a far-reaching package of tax laws, com-
monly known as the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017”, henceforth TCJA. A hallmark
of this reform is a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35 to 21 percent, alongside
similarly large cuts in tax rates on other forms of business income. A second important
change is the introduction of immediate expensing of investments, replacing deprecia-
tion allowances. This means that firms can now deduct their investments from taxable
income immediately upon purchase, instead of doing so gradually as the invested capital
depreciates.
Some claim that these reforms could reinvigorate the increasingly sclerotic U.S.
business climate.1 Figure 1 shows that the startup rate has almost halved since the late
1970s, and that the exit rate has also declined somewhat. Other indicators of business
dynamism have declined as well, see for example Decker et al. (2016). These trends are
a cause for concern, since a less dynamic economy is often associated with less creative
destruction, which may have important macroeconomic repercussions.
Although it seems likely that a tax reform of this scale will leave a significant mark
on the U.S. economy, little is known about what exactly will be it’s impact. Data to
be released over the next few years may reveal how the U.S. economy is changing, but
even then it will be difficult to attribute these changes to particular aspects of the tax
reform.2
In this paper, we use a firm dynamics model to understand the effects of the business
tax cuts and the introduction of immediate expensing on business dynamism, and
1Claims along these lines have for example been made during the U.S. Congress committee meeting
“The Startup Slump: Can Tax Reform Help Revive American Entrepreneurship?”, held on October
3, 2017.
2Many policy changes were implemented simultaneously. For example, the structure of individual
income taxes has also been reformed as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. In this paper, we
focus on the taxation of firms, more specifically corporate and pass-through entities.
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Figure 1: The startup rate and the exit rate in the United States.
















Source: Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). The BDS are a snapshot taken in March
of each year. The figure centers entry and exit rates rate around the middle of the
observation year.
the macro economy in general. Our framework builds on the canonical firm-dynamics
models of Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), in which firms are
subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and entry and exit of firms are endogenous
outcomes. We integrate capital investment (see also Bartelsman et al. (2013)) and
adjustment costs (see also Clementi and Palazzo (2016)) into this framework. Moreover,
we introduce a tax on business income and model explicitly the two expensing regimes.
The model is then used to analyze qualitatively the various transmission channels of
the tax reform. Moreover, we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy, and evaluate
the quantitative effects using numerical simulations.
Our analysis complements recent work of Barro and Furman (2018) and Mertens
(2018), who consider the effects of the TCJA on real activity, but do not focus on
business dynamism. Barro and Furman (2018) analyze the tax reform through the
lens of a neoclassical growth model with an infinitely-lived, representative firm. Our
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results highlight that considering firm dynamics brings forward new channels through
which the fiscal reform may affect the aggregate economy. In particular, key effects of
the reform operate through the incentives to start or terminate firms, a channel that
is absent in representative-firm models. Mertens (2018) uses a reduced-form empirical
model to make projections on the effects of the TCJA. Finally, our quantitative model
builds on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), who study the effects of firing restrictions,
but do not model capital investments or the taxation of business income.
To understand the transmission channels of the tax reform, we differentiate between
direct and indirect effects. The direct effects operate via the responses of incumbent
firms to the change in taxation, abstracting from the responses of equilibrium wages.
The indirect channels capture the responses of incumbents to changes in equilibrium
wages and changes in the number of operating businesses. They also encompass how
changing incentives to start a business affect the number of firms that enter in equilib-
rium.
We show that the direct effects are either absent or push towards less dynamism.
The taxes are levied on firm profits, a reduction in the tax rate does not directly distort
marginal decisions regarding hiring, investment and exit, provided that investments can
be immediately expensed. Similarly, a switch from gradual to immediate expensing has
no direct effects, provided that it does not change the present value of tax deductions.
Realistically, however, full expensing increases the present value of tax deductions,
as firms discount deductions to be received in the future. Barro and Furman (2018)
estimate that the move towards full expensing increased the present value of deductions
on equipment by about 20 percent.3 In that case, the introduction of full expensing
3The present value might be affected for several reasons. One is that firms discount future income
at a positive rate. Provided that firms discount future profits with a positive rate, they will prefer to
receive tax deductions sooner rather than later. Similarly, the present value of deductions might be
affected if the depreciation schedule assumed by the fiscal authority does not coincide with economic
depreciation.
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substantially lowers the user cost of capital. This reduction in costs directly discourages
firms from exiting, which lowers economic dynamism.
On the other hand, the indirect effects of the tax reform push towards a more
dynamic economy. In particular, the reduction in the tax rate increases firm values
and hence encourages entry. As a result, labor demand increases, which drives up
equilibrium wages. The latter makes the process of firm selection more stringent as only
relatively productive firms are capable of surviving in the more competitive economy.
Exiting firms then make way for new entrants increasing firm churn, a primary measure
of business dynamism. Similarly, the introduction of immediate expensing increases
wages and fosters dynamism, provided that it lowers the user cost of capital. In this
case, the increase in wages happens for two distinct reasons. First, the reduction in
the cost of capital triggers more firm entry, which increases aggregate labor demand.
Second, a lower cost of capital increases investment, which raises the marginal product
of labor and hence wages.
Using quantitative simulations, we evaluate the net impact of the tax reform in
the long run. Our findings show that, overall, the indirect effects dominate and that
the reform increases economic dynamism dramatically. The increase in dynamism is
potentially large enough to entirely offset the decline in the startup rate observed in
the U.S. since the 1970’s.
We also find that the reform creates a large increase in aggregate output, investment
and employment. These outcomes are due to both the introduction of full expensing
and the cut in the tax rate. The large output effects of a cut business tax rates contrasts
typical findings in representative-agent models, in which such taxes tend to create few
or no distortions.4 Our analysis thus underscores the importance of accounting for firm
4The underlying reason is that in representative-agent models, profit taxes proportionally affect net
revenues and costs, the latter via tax deductions. In a firm-dynamics model this is not the case. The
entry cost, an important cost component for startups, is borne by the entrepreneur before the firm is
created. Therefore, entry costs do not qualify as tax-deductable costs and are thus insensitive to a tax
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dynamics and the associated equilibrium effects when evaluating the macroeconomic
impact of tax reforms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the
important features of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in more detail. Section 3 discusses
how business dynamism evolved following two large tax reforms in the 1980s. Section 4
presents the model and a number of qualitative results. In Section 5, we calibrate the
model to the U.S. economy and evaluate the quantitative effects of the tax reform. In
Section 6 we discuss some limitations of the model and offer suggestions for extensions.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 is one of the most sweeping tax reforms
in modern U.S. history. There are many aspects to this tax reform, all of which could
potentially leave a mark on business dynamism. In this section, we discuss in more
detail some of the largest changes. We focus on changes which directly affect firms, and
are therefore likely to be particularly important in affecting business dynamism.
Taxation of C corporations
The taxation of U.S. firms depends on their legal form. A prominent category is formed
by so called C corporations, which pay corporate income tax on their profits. C corpo-
rations only make up a modest fraction of the total number of firms, but are nonetheless
important contributors to the total U.S. tax bill since they are relatively large. Over
the last few decades, between 60 and and 90 percent of total tax receipts from U.S.
firms were paid by C corporations, see for instance Dyrda and Pugsley (2018).
change. A cut in the tax rate increases net revenues, but does not proportionately increase net costs
for prospective entrants. Therefore, entry increases.
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Prior to the TCJA, corporate income has been taxed at a statutory top rate of 35
percent for over two decades. However, the effective tax rate has been lower for many
firms due to progressivity and various deductions and exemptions, see GAO (2016).
The TCJA permanently lowered the corporate tax rate to a flat 21 percent, while at
the same time reducing or eliminating certain deductions. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) expects revenues from corporate income taxes to fall by 18 percent, from
1.5 percent of GDP to 1.2 percent of GDP, largely due to the enactment of the TCJA,
see CBO (2018). In addition to the federal tax there are also state-level corporate taxes
which vary across states.
Taxation of pass-through businesses
Most U.S. businesses, and in particular small firms, are organized as so called S corpo-
rations, partnerships or sole proprietorships. These firms, also know as pass-through
businesses, do not pay corporate income tax. Rather, their owners pay individual in-
come taxes based on the profits of their business. Under the TCJA, also personal
income taxes are reduced substantially, via both a reduction in rates and a shift in tax
brackets. Pass-through businesses benefit directly from this reduction. In addition,
the TCJA stipulates a new 20 percent deduction especially for certain pass-through
businesses. As for C corporations, the TCJA thus creates a substantial reduction in
the tax burden on these firms.
Note also that firms can always change their legal form to their own benefit. In
addition, the cuts in individual taxation are currently subject to a sunset clause, from
2025 onward, but may become permanent.
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Expensing of investments
Finally, the TCJA benefits firms via a change in the expensing rules of investments.
Under the TCJA, firms are allowed to deduct investments in equipment from taxes in
the year of purchase, rather than gradually over time and in tandem with depreciation.
In previous years, immediate expensing was allowed only partially. From 2013 until
2017, firms could deduct 50 percent of their investments immediately.
Under the current law, full expensing will be phased out between 2022 and 2026,
but it may become a permanent feature of the tax law. The CBO reports a budgetary
impact of the change in expensing rules that is comparable to the budgetary impact of
the reduction in corporate income tax rates.
3 Tax reforms and business dynamism in the 1980s
Tax systems are complex and can change along many dimensions. Moreover, tax reforms
occur only infrequently and may be designed in part in response to the state of the
economy. These factors make it difficult to unequivocally estimate the effects of tax
reforms from the data. It is nonetheless useful to consider what happened following
previous reforms. Arguably, two of the largest reforms of business taxation in post-war
U.S. history, aside from the TCJA, were implemented under president Ronald Reagan
in the 1980s. The first is the Economic Recovery of 1981 (implemented in August) and
the second is the Tax reform Act of 1986 (implemented in October).
Table 3 shows the effects of these reforms on tax revenues, as projected by the Con-
gressional Budget Office at the time of implementation. The 1981 reform slashed both
individual and corporate income taxes, implying a large decline in the tax burden on
both households and businesses. In this sense, the reform was similar to the TCJA
of 2017. By contrast, the 1986 reform strongly reduced individual income taxes, but
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Table 1: Effects of the 1981 and 1986 reforms on tax revenues, CBO projections.
Economic Recovery Act of 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Individual Income Taxes, billions -28 (-9%) -74 (-20%) -117 (-27%) -147 (-30%) -186 (-34%)
Corporate Income Taxes, billions -11 (-18%) -17 (-25%) -25 (-29%) -36 (-36%) -28 (-43%)
Tax Reform Act of 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Individual Income Taxes, billions -15 (-4%) -26.6 (-7%) -29.6 (-7%) -22.3 (-5%) -18.8 (-4%)
Corporate Income Taxes, billions +27 (+36%) +25 (+27%) +21 (+20%) +23 (+20%) +25 (+20%)
Source: CBO (1998), Tables 4, 5, 10 and 11.
increased corporate taxes. The overall reform was roughly revenue neutral, but created
a large shift of taxation from households to businesses.5 From the perspective of busi-
nesses, the two reforms were therefore very different: the 1981 reform strongly reduced
their tax bills, which surged again after the 1986 reform.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of business dynamism around the two tax reform, as
measured by the firm churn rate in the Business Dynamics Statistics. The churn rate is
defined as the sum of the firm entry and exit rates.6 The figure shows a sharp increase
in the churn rate following the Economic Recovery Act of 1981. Following the 1986
reform, and the associated increase in corporate taxes, the churn rate declined sharply.
Taking these facts at face value, the empirical behavior of the churn rate in the
1980s is consistent with the idea that a reduction in business taxation can substantially
boost business dynamism. One should of course be careful interpreting these patterns,
especially given that the 1980s were a rather turbulent period. For example, the 1981
reform was enacted at the onset of a deep recession and at the peak of a monetary
tightening. Nonetheless, the sharp increase in dynamism following the 1981 tax cuts
and the subsequent reversal after the 1986 reform are striking facts.
5The increase in corporate taxation occurred despite the fact that the statutory rate was actually
reduced. However, the effects of this reduction was more than offset by a broadening of the corporate
tax base, via the elimination of the investment tax credit, an increase in assumed depreciation lifetimes,
and other measures; see for instance Poterba (1992).
6Since Figure 1 shows a clear downward trend in the entry and the exit rate we take out a linear
trend, estimated over the period 1979 until 2015.
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Figure 2: Business dynamism in the 1980s: churn rate.

































churn rate = entry rate + exit rate
Economic Recovery Act of 1981
Tax Reform Act of 1986
Note: All data are taken from the Business Dynamics Statistics of the Census Bureau.
The churn rate is defined as the sum of the firm entry and exit rate. The BDS are a
snapshot taken in March of each year. The figure centres the churn rate around the
middle of the observation year.
4 Model and qualitative results
We now consider a firm dynamics model, in order to better understand through which
channels a tax reform like the TCJA can affect dynamism. The model is a straight-
forward extension of the model developed in Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). Firms produce using capital and labor and are hit by idiosyncratic
productivity shocks over their lifetime. Importantly, business dynamism is endogenous
as firm entry and exit are both the result of optimal firm decisions.
The model is used to analyze the long-run effects of changes in both the rate at
which firm profits are taxed, and in the way investment expenses can be deducted. In
doing so, we differentiate between the direct effects that changes in taxation have on
the behavior of incumbent firms, and the indirect effects which occur in response to
changes in wages and the number of entrants.
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4.1 Model description
We consider a general equilibrium model with an endogenous measure of heteroge-
neous firms and a representative household. The economy is stationary and time is
discrete. Firms produce a homogeneous good, maximizing the present value of after-
tax profits. They operate decreasing returns-to-scale production technologies, denoted
by y = f(k, l, z), where y denotes output, k is the firm’s capital stock, l is its la-
bor input and z is Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The latter is firm-specific and
follows a Markov process. Production also requires a fixed operational cost cf , denom-
inated in units of goods. Capital depreciates at a rate δ and we denote investment
by i = k − (1− δ) k−1, where k−1 denotes lagged capital. Capital becomes productive
immediately in the period of investment. A firm further faces a tax bill, which we will
detail below.
Incumbent firms face a cost of capital adjustment given by ψ(k, k−1) ≥ 0, which
we will specify below. At the beginning of a period, a firm chooses whether to exit
or to continue. At this point, the firm knows its lagged TFP level z−1. If the firm
continues, it learns its current productivity realization z and generates a before-tax
cash flow given by πc = y − wn − i − cf − ψ(k, k−1), where a superscript c denotes a
continuing firm. If the firm exits, it avoids the fixed cost, sells its remaining capital,
and terminates operations forever. It therefore generates a final, before-tax cash flow
πx = −i− ψ(0, k−1) =(1− δ) k−1 − ψ(0, k−1), where a superscript x denotes an exiting
firm.
There is free entry of firms. After paying an entry cost, ce (denominated in units
of goods), an entrant draws its initial lagged value z−1 from a distribution. Thereafter,
entrants behave as incumbents, i.e. they choose to either exit immediately or to start
producing. We assume that entrants start with zero capital and are exempted from the
10
Table 2: Tax bills under the two expensing regimes.
Continuing firms (T c) Exiting firms (T x)
Gradual expensing: τ (πc + i− δk) τ (πx − (1− δ) k−1) = −τψ(0, k−1)
Immediate expensing: τπc τπx = τ (1− δ) k−1 − τψ(0, k−1)
capital adjustment cost.7
Let us now turn to the discussion of how firms are taxed. Taxable business income,
calculated as revenues minus costs, is taxed at a rate τ . We assume that the costs
which firms can deduct include labor and capital expenses, the fixed cost of production
and the adjustment costs. We further assume that entry costs cannot be deducted,
as we think of those primarily as costs associated with red tape and the development
of a business plan, which are therefore not tax deductable. The deduction of capital
expenses depends on the investment expensing regime.
Table 2 shows the tax bills for continuing firms (T c) and exiting firms (T x) under
both regimes. Consider first the gradual expensing regime (top row), in which the
deduction of capital takes the form of a depreciation allowance. This means that in-
vestment expenses are excluded from the calculation of taxable income. Instead, firms
deduct the amount of capital that is lost in depreciation during the production process
in a given period. For simplicity, we assume that the depreciation schedule assumed
by the fiscal authority coincides with the speed of economic depreciation. That is, the
deduction equals δk. Note that if the firm exits, it does not pay any taxes since the
final sale of capital is a negative investment, which is excluded from taxable income
under the gradual expensing regime. Instead, the firm receives a subsidy, based on the
adjustment cost paid in the final period, as it can carry back this cost as a deduction
7Similarly, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) exempt entrants from labor adjustment costs.
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on previously paid taxes.8
In the immediate expensing regime (bottom row in Table 1), a continuing firm faces
a tax bill that is proportional to its flow profit. Moreover, an exiting firm may now be
confronted with a tax bill, as the government recaptures part of the tax deduction on
investment, insofar the invested capital has not fully depreciated during the production
process.9
Given all the above, firms optimize profits, taking prices and wages as given. Let
r be the rate at which firms discount future profits. The firm value at the moment of
taking the exit decision can be expressed recursively as:




πc − T c + 1
1 + r
V (z, k)}, πx − T x
}
, (1)
subject to the TFP process and the expressions for πc, πx, T and T x given above, and
where E is the conditional expectations operator. Given a capital level k−1, there is
now a cutoff value of productivity z∗−1 at which the firm is precisely indifferent between
exiting and continuing. Firms with a level of productivity below this threshold choose
to exit. This cutoff is increasing in the wage w, as higher wages reduce firm profits,
pushing out the least productive firms.
Free entry implies that ce≥ EeVe(z−1), where the expectation here is taken with
respect to the distribution of initial productivity draws and Ve(z−1) denotes the value
of an entrant with a draw z−1 . We focus on equilibria with positive entry, i.e. the free-
entry condition binds with equality. The right hand side of the condition, EeVe(z−1),
is typically declining in the wage as well as in the cutoff level. Hence, the free-entry
condition defines a negative relation between the cutoff and the wage, as also noted by
8Realistically, a firm might also be subject to a capital gains tax when selling capital. This is not
relevant in our model since the price of capital is constant.
9This is known as “depreciation recapture”.
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Melitz (2003).
Finally, the economy is populated by a a representative, price-taking, household.
The flow utility of the household is given by U(C,N) = lnC − νN , where C denotes
aggregate consumption and N is aggregate labor supply, which we assume is exogenous
and fixed over time. We further assume that the government runs a balanced budget
and that all tax revenues are rebated to the household in a lump-sum way. Labor market
clearing implies that labor demand, aggregated over all firms, equals N , whereas goods
market clearing implies that Y = C+I, where Y is aggregate output, and I denotes the
aggregate investments into capital, capital adjustment costs, fixed costs of operation,
and entry costs.
Before we evaluate the model quantitatively, we derive a number of qualitative re-
sults which help to understand how tax reforms affect economic dynamism. We distin-
guish between “direct” and “indirect” effects. The direct effects capture the responses
of firms to a change in taxation, holding fixed the equilibrium wage. The indirect are
defined as the remaining effects which arise in general equilibrium and also involve the
behavior of potential entrants.
4.2 Reduction in the tax rate
We present three qualitative results, which we prove in Appendix A. The first result
concerns the effect of a change in taxes on incumbents:
Proposition 1. Under immediate expensing and an exogenous wage, the decisions of
incumbent firms are not affected by a change in the tax rate τ .
Intuitively, under immediate expensing the tax rate affects net revenues and costs pro-
portionally, the latter because of deductions. As a result, a change in the tax rate does
not affect the firms’ marginal decisions on employment and investment. It also does not
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affect the firms’ exit decisions, as the continuation value and exit value are affected pro-
portionally by the tax as well. The tax skims off a proportion of firm values, but never
turns a positive net value negative. A firm that is economically viable in the absence
of taxation, will therefore continue to be viable when the tax is imposed, as long as
the tax rate remains below one hundred percent. Proposition 1 therefore implies that,
under immediate expensing, business dynamism, aggregate output, and productivity
are not directly affected by a change in the tax rate.
Note that this irrelevance result regards the direct effect of a change in taxation,
keeping constant the equilibrium wage. However, a decline in the tax rate does trigger
a change in behavior via indirect effects, which is our second result:
Proposition 2. Under immediate expensing, a permanent reduction in the tax rate
increases the exit cutoff z∗−1 via an increase in the equilibrium wage.
This result implies that selection becomes more stringent when the tax rate is reduced,
as only firms with productivity levels above the cutoff survive. The result derives from
the behavior of entrants. A decline in the tax rate pushes up firm values. The free-
entry condition implies that the expected value of an entrant equals the entry cost, ce.
Therefore, an increase in values due to a tax cut must be offset by a decline in values
due to an increase in the equilibrium wage. The latter also reduces the continuation
values of incumbents, who then become more inclined to exit (i.e. the exit cutoff shifts
up).
Intuitively, increased firm entry pushes up labor demand and hence wages, which
makes the least productive firms terminate operations. As firms are hit by produc-
tivity shocks in every period, the exit rate increases persistently. Therefore, economic
dynamism increases with a positive impact on aggregate TFP. Importantly, however,
this increase in dynamism does not follow from the direct effect of the tax cut on
incumbents, but rather from the ensuing general equilibrium effects.
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An important assumption underlying the result is that the entry cost cannot be
deducted from taxes. Otherwise, a reduction in taxes would lift both the net-of-tax
entrant values and the entry cost. We believe it is reasonable to assume that entry cost
are not tax deductible (or at least not entirely), as we think of entry costs as mainly
representing red tape costs and the effort involved in the development of a new business
proposition. Our assumption is also consistent with the fact that many firms in the
model immediately exit after paying the entry cost. These firms never make profits and
hence do not get to declare taxes.
4.3 Immediate versus gradual expensing
Next, we consider how immediate and gradual expensing impact on economic dy-
namism. To this end, let us define the “expensing rate”, denoted λ, as the present
value of tax deductions, per unit of investment (including a deduction upon exit which
applies under gradual expensing), see also Barro and Furman (2018). Under immediate
expensing, this present value is trivially given by λ = 1.
Under gradual expensing, the moment when the firm exits may potentially matter.
Consider a firm which exits j periods from the current period. The expensing rate for












. Without discounting (r = 0), the
present value collapses to λ(j) = 1, i.e. it is the same as under immediate expensing,
regardless of when the firm exits. We elaborate more on the expensing rate in the
Appendix. This constitutes our third qualitative result:
Proposition 3. Without discounting (r = 0), the decisions of incumbent firms under
gradual and immediate expensing coincide.
This result follows from the fact that, without discounting, the moment of exit has no
effect on the expensing rate. Under both regimes the expensing rate is unity. With
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discounting (r > 0), however, the expensing rate is lower under gradual expensing. Re-
alistically, the latter case is the more relevant one, and we will evaluate it quantitatively
in the next section.
4.4 The user cost of capital
We now consider the user cost of capital, allowing discounting for an arbitrary expense
rate λ. For simplicity, we assume that the expensing rate is independent of the firm’s
moment of exit, and we abstract from adjustment costs. The first-order optimality









The left-hand side is the marginal product of capital. The right-hand side is of
often labeled the user cost of capital, i.e. the hypothetical rental value of a unit of
capital. The equation shows that under a unit expensing rate (λ = 1), the tax rate τ is





level corresponds to the undistorted choice. If in addition there is no discounting, the
user cost is simply equal to the depreciation rate δ.
When λ < 1 (as is typically the case under gradual expensing, as discussed above)





when firms cannot fully expense their capital investments, they are effectively taxed on
their capital. As a result, they are less inclined to invest, which increases the marginal
product of capital in equilibrium. In other words, expensing at a rate that is less than
100 percent creates a capital distortion which pushes firms to invest less. The magnitude
of this distortion is increasing in the tax rate τ . That is, there is an interaction between
10Note that the marginal cost of capital investment is given by 1− λτ whereas the marginal benefit
equals (∂f(k,l,z)∂k +
1−δ
1+r ) (1− τ).
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the expensing rate and the tax rate.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that firm continuation values are decreasing in
the user cost of capital (as they are in the user cost of labor, i.e. the wage), whereas exit
values are unaffected. Therefore, the introduction of immediate expensing generally
increases continuation values, by lowering the user cost of capital. Firms are thus
discouraged from exiting, which reduces economic dynamism.
4.5 Taking stock
We have highlighted a number of lessons so far. First, under immediate expensing a cut
in the tax rate has no direct effect on the decisions of incumbent firms. The economy
at large is affected, but only through equilibrium effects, arising via increased entry.
These effects push towards more dynamism.
Second, in the absence of discounting the behavior of firms is equivalent under
immediate and gradual expensing. Moreover, firm values are unaffected, so no indirect
equilibrium effects arise. Therefore, the introduction of immediate expensing would
have no effect on dynamism or macroeconomic outcomes in general.
Third, when firms do discount the future, both direct and indirect effects arise
when immediate expensing is introduced. The direct effects stem from an increase in
the effective expensing rate, which removes distortion to the capital decision, reducing
the user cost of capital to its efficient level. This reduction in costs encourages firms to
invest more and exit less easily.
We have not considered explicitly the indirect effects that are triggered by the in-
troduction of immediate expensing, but we anticipate two effects. First, firm values
increase, which encourages entry, and triggers more dynamism, via increased labor de-
mand which increases wages. Second, the increased investment pushes up the marginal




We now evaluate quantitatively the long-run effects of moving from a high-tax, gradual
expensing regime to a low-tax, full expensing regime. In what follows, we first describe
the model’s parametrization. Within the calibrated model, we then implement the
policy change and quantify the effects on both aggregate variables and characteristics
of business dynamism.
For the purpose of the quantitative analysis, we extend our baseline model to in-
clude stochastic shocks to operational costs, as in e.g. Clementi and Palazzo (2016).
Unlike in the baseline where the exit policy is determined by a threshold level of pro-
ductivity (for a given capital stock), stochastic cost shocks result in all firms having a
positive probability of survival. We assume that fixed operational costs are distributed
logistically with mean µH and dispersion parameter σH .
5.1 Calibration
The model period is assumed to be one year and we set the discount rate to r = 0.04.
The production function is defined as y = z(kαl1−α)θ, with α = 0.35 and the span
of control parameter, θ, equal to 0.9. The former mimics the capital share in income,
while the latter falls within the range of values documented by Basu and Fernald (1997).
The depreciation rate of capital is set to be 8 percent. The remaining parameters are
set such that the model matches a number of statistics in the data. While all model
parameters typically influence the properties of the entire model, in what follows we
highlight the key moment for each parameter.
The mean, autocorrelation and dispersion of the firm-specific TFP process are set
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Table 3: Parameter values
parameter value
r discount rate 0.04
α capital share 0.35
θ span of control 0.90
δ depreciation rate 0.08
ρz autocorrelation of TFP shocks 0.38
σz standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.19
µz mean of TFP shocks 0.26
σH dispersion of cost shocks 2.95
µH mean of cost shocks 2.20
ζ0 non-convex adjustment cost 0.001
ζ1 convex adjustment cost 0.27
ce entry cost 1.55
υ disutility of labor 0.01
such that the model matches average firm size, taken from the Business Dynamics
Statistics (BDS), the autocorrelation and the dispersion of investment rates taken from
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The mean and dispersion of the stochastic operation
costs are set in order to match the average exit rate of all firms and the ratio of
average firm exit of one and five year old firms (both taken from the BDS). Finally,
adjustment costs are assumed to take the form as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006),





)2k−1, where ζ0(i) = ζ0 whenever investment is non-zero
and ζ0(i) = 0 otherwise. We set ζ0 and ζ1 to match the inaction rate and the average
investment rate documented in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Finally, we set the
disutility of labor, ν, such that the wage rate is normalized to 1 and we set the entry
cost, ce, such that the mass of entrants is normalized to 1. All the calibrated parameters
are shown in Table 3 and the model-predicted and actual target values are presented
in Table 4.
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Table 4: Targets: data and model
target data model
investment rate mean 0.12 0.10
investment rate standard deviation 0.34 0.39
investment autocorrelation 0.06 0.06
inaction rate 0.08 0.09
average exit rate 0.09 0.09
relative exit rate 2.2 2.3
average size 21 21
Note: the target values for the average, cross-sectional dispersion, autocorrelation of
investment rates and the inaction rate are taken from Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
Values for the targets on exit rates and average size are taken from the Business Dy-
namics Statistics.
5.2 Quantitative results
We now evaluate the quantitative effects of the tax reform. The baseline model as-
sumes a tax rate of τ = 0.35 and gradual expensing. Departing from this baseline, we
consider three alternative policy scenarios: (i) a reduction in the tax rate to τ = 0.21
(with continued gradual expensing), (ii) the introduction of immediate expensing (while
holding the tax rate fixed at τ = 0.35), and (iii) a combined reduction in the tax rate
to τ = 0.21 and the introduction of immediate expensing. While the last scenario most
closely resembles the reform recently implemented in the U.S., the first two allow us to
understand how the two different parts of the reform contribute to the overall outcomes.
In all cases, we evaluate the long-run effects of the tax reform, comparing the stationary
equilibrium of the economy before the tax reform to the stationary equilibrium after
the reform.
Let us start by focusing on the effects of reducing taxes alone, reform (i). Figure
3 shows the average effects of the reduction in the tax rate alone, by firm age. The
figure separates direct (partial equilibrium) effects, holding fixed firm entry and the
wage rate, from overall effects, which take into account that the entry rate and in turn
the labor market adjust to the policy changes.
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Figure 3: Effects of tax reform: reduction in tax rate only
































after reform: direct only
after reform: overall
Note: the figure shows, by firm age, average exit rates (top left), average firm size
(top right), average capital (bottom left) and average TFP (bottom right). The lines
represent the baseline model (“before reform”), the direct (partial equilibrium) effects
(“after reform: direct only”) and the overall (general equilibrium) effects (“after reform:
overall”). The policy change considered is a tax reduction from τ = 0 .35 to τ = 0 .21 ,
while maintaining gradual expensing.
Following a reduction in taxes, holding wages fixed, the exit rate falls for all firm ages
(upper left panel). Moreover, incumbent firms expand both in terms of employment
(upper right panel) and in terms of capital accumulation (lower left panel). The weaker
process of firm selection then leads to a slight drop of average firm TFP (lower right
panel).
These direct effects might seem surprising from the perspective of Proposition 1.
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Note however that this proposition applies to an economy with immediate expensing,
whereas the experiment underlying Figure 1 assumes gradual expensing. Appendix
B confirms that under full expensing employment, capital and the exit rate are, as
expected, not directly affected by a cut in the tax rate. Therefore, the direct effects
observed in Figure 3 rely crucially on the presence of a gradual expensing regime. The
cut in the tax rate simultaneously increases net-of-tax revenues and net-of-tax costs.
Under immediate expensing, these effects balance out and firms do not directly change
their behavior. However, under gradual expensing the increase in net revenues exceeds
the increase in net costs in percentage terms. In response, more firms stay in operation,
and firms increase employment as well as capital investment.
Consider now the overall effects of a cut in the tax rate, also shown in Figure 5.2.
In equilibrium, the more favorable tax environment encourages firm entry. Together
with more firm entry comes higher labor demand, which pushes wages above their
initial values. The increase in the wage discourages firms from hiring, and average size
declines. Also, these effects strengthen firm selection as only relatively productive firms
can afford to operate on the more competitive labor market. Therefore, the overall
outcomes of lower taxes include a higher exit rate, lower average firm size and average
capital accumulation and somewhat higher average TFP, by firm age.
In other words, the overall impact of the decline in the tax rate is thus to increase
business dynamism, as measured by the rates at which firms enter and exit the econ-
omy. This increase in dynamism crucially relies on indirect (general equilibrium) effects
operating through firm entry and the labor market.
Next, consider the effects of changing from gradual to immediate expensing, holding
fixed the tax rate at 35 percent. The direct and indirect effects are shown in Figure
5.2. Consider first the direct effects. The change in expensing regime directly lowers
the user cost of capital, as explained in the previous section. In response, firms invest
22
Figure 4: Effects of tax reform: immediate expensing only





























after reform: direct only
after reform: overall
Note: the figure shows, by firm age, average exit rates (top left), average firm size
(top right), average capital (bottom left) and average TFP (bottom right). The lines
represent the baseline model (“before reform”), the direct (partial equilibrium) effects
(“after reform: direct only”) and the overall (general equilibrium) effects (“after reform:
overall”). The policy change considered is a move from gradual to immediate expensing,
while maintaining a tax rate of τ = 0 .35 .
more in capital. This increases the marginal product of labor, and therefore firms also
increase employment. Finally, the lower user cost of capital allows more firms to stay
in operation, reducing the exit rate dramatically.
While the direct effects bring about a strong reduction in the exit rate and an
expansion of employment and capital accumulation, the general equilibrium forces more
than offset these effects. The lower user cost of capital increases firm values, encouraging
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entry and pushing up wages, which spurs firm exit. The overall impact of moving
towards immediate expensing is similar to that of lowering the tax rate. In particular,
the move to full expensing leads to an increase in dynamism.
Finally, Figure 5.2 shows the impact of the combined policy reform with both a
reduction in taxes and a move towards immediate expensing. Once again, while the
direct effects of these policy changes bring about a strong decrease in the exit rates,
resulting in a rise in firm sizes and capital accumulation, these outcomes are overturned
in general equilibrium. By contrast, the overall effects of the policy reform is a strong
increase in exit rates, a decrease in firm size and capital accumulation and a slight
increase in average firm productivity by age.
The long-run macroeconomic impact of the changes in taxation is shown Table 5,
which reports the values of several macroeconomic variables, relative to their values
before the tax reform. The top row of the table shows the effects of the overall reform,
i.e. a simultaneous cut in the tax rate and a change to immediate expensing.
The tax reform generates large long-run macroeconomic effects: aggregate output
and the aggregate capital stock increase by more than forty percent, whereas labor
supply rises by a fifth. Consumption and wages increase by sixteen percent. These
gains are brought about by an expansion along the extensive margin, whereby the
number of firms is almost five times as high as in the baseline model. At the same time,
individual firms are much smaller (by about fifty percent) and invest about a third as
much into capital as before the reform.
The increased economic activity is reflected in greater firm churn: the startup rate
after the reform is almost twice as high as before. Because of more stringent firm
selection, average TFP increases by about two percent.11 Recall that in the data, the
startup rate fell by about fifty percent, since the 1970’s. Thus, according to the model,
11Since we consider stationary economies, the startup rate equals the exit rate.
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Figure 5: Effets of tax reform: lower taxes and immediate expensing





























after reform: direct only
after reform: overall
Note: the figure shows, by firm age, average exit rates (top left), average firm size
(top right), average capital (bottom left) and average TFP (bottom right). The lines
represent the baseline model (“before reform”), the direct (partial equilibrium) effects
(“after reform: direct only”) and the overall (general equilibrium) effects (“after reform:
overall”). The policy change considered is a tax reduction from τ = 0 .35 to τ = 0 .21 ,
and a move from gradual to immediate expensing.
the tax reform would reverse this decline.
Rows (ii) and (iii) of Table 5 show the effects of individual policy changes. It is
apparent that while both policy changes have relatively similar effects on aggregate
variables, the reduction in taxes has does more to increase business dynamism. In
particular, lower taxes raise the entry rate by almost eighty percent. This increased
firm churn then raises average TFP by one percent. While moving towards immediate
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Table 5: Results: aggregate effects of tax reform, relative to baseline.
Y N K C W navg irate mtotal tfpavg erate
(i) tax reduction and immediate expensing
1.42 1.22 1.56 1.16 1.16 0.55 0.36 4.97 1.02 1.95
(ii) tax reduction only
1.24 1.13 1.24 1.09 1.09 0.68 0.55 3.56 1.01 1.78
(iii) immediate expensing only
1.25 1.12 1.45 1.12 1.12 0.69 0.48 2.20 1.00 1.39
Note: Aggregate output (Y ), employment (N), capital (K), consumption (C), the wage
(W), average size (navg), average investment rate (irate), total number of firms (mtotal ),
average firm TFP (tfpavg) and the entry rate (erate). All variables are expressed relative to
the baseline calibration (τ = 0.35, gradual expense rate). Lower tax rate: τ = 0.21.
expensing (and holding the tax rate unchanged from the baseline scenario) also increases
the entry rate, it does so by less.
Finally, Table 6 shows the size and age distributions in the data, the baseline model
and in the model are overall affected by the reform. Our previous results already
showed that average firm size falls considerably. This is confirmed by the top panel
of Table 6, which depicts the size distributions. The entire distribution shifts towards
small businesses with only just over two percent of all firms having more than fifty
employees.
Similarly, the bottom panel of Table 6 shows the age distributions in the data,
baseline model and the model following the reform. As shown previously, the model
predicts an increase in the exit rate across all firm age groups. This is reflected in a
strong shift towards young businesses. The share of young firms (less than 6 years old)
increases from 48 percent to 80 percent. Only about 3 percent of all business make it
past the age of 15 years.
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Table 6: Size and age distributions
size distribution
<50 50-99 100-249 250-500 >500
data 95.8 2.3 1.2 0.4 0.3
model: baseline 93.6 5.0 1.2 0.1 0.1
model: after reform 97.8 1.8 0.3 0.1 0.0
age distribution
<1 1-5 6-10 11-15 >15
data 9.8 29.4 18.4 12.9 29.5
model: baseline 13.8 34.3 17.9 11.6 22.3
model: after reform 28.7 51.0 13.2 4.5 2.6
Note: the table shows firm size and age distributions. All data are taken from the
Business Dynamics Statistics.
Finally, we report the budgetary effects of the tax reform in the model. Considering
first only the direct effects of the tax reform, we find that the cut in the tax rate reduces
total tax revenues from 16 percent of GDP to 8 percent. The introduction of immediate
expensing, in isolation, reduces tax revenues to 7 percent. Taken jointly, the effect of
the tax reform is to reduce tax revenues from 16 percent to only 5 percent of GDP.
Taking into account the general equilibrium effects, we find that the overall effect
of the tax reform is to increase tax revenues to 22 percent of GDP. Remarkably, the
equilibrium effects thus more than offset the direct effects. As more firms enter the
economy and the distribution of firms shifts towards younger and smaller businesses
with higher profit rates, the tax base increases which in turn raises tax revenues. How-
ever, it is important to note that here we only compute long-run effects. An increase
in long-run tax receipts might be offset by a decrease along the transition path. In
particular, part of the increase in tax revenues is due to the fact that the economy has
a substantially higher capital stock in the long run. Along the transition path, firms
invest more in capital, and therefore claim larger tax deductions. Thus, the higher
long-run tax receipts are likely associated with lower tax receipts in the short run.
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6 Some caveats
Before concluding this article, we highlight five issues which warrant caution when
projecting the model results onto the real-world U.S. economy and the effects of the
TCJA in particular. We believe that these issues can be a fruitful starting point for
future research.
First, our model results apply to the long run and heavily rely on indirect equilibrium
effects via increased entry. Setting aside the question of the exact transition path of
the economy, it might simply take a substantial amount of time before the long-run
effects of the reform fully manifest themselves. This is important given that the TCJA
is currently subject to a number of sunset clauses, as described in Section 2.
Second, we have assumed that the tax reform is financed via an increase in lump-
sum taxes. We have thus sidestepped any distortionary effects that might arise from
changes in other distortionary taxes, which realistically might be required to balance
the long-run government budget.
Third, we have focused on the effects of the business tax rate and investment ex-
pensing regime, leaving out many other specific features of the U.S. tax system and
its reform. For example, we have ignored the fact that individual income taxes were
also reduced under the TCJA. Via changes in household labor supply and equilibrium
effects, this change might also affect business dynamism.12 Also, immediate expens-
ing was already partially applied in the U.S. in the years leading up to the TCJA, as
mentioned in Section 2.
Fourth, our model abstracts from an entrepreneurial choice margin and entrepreneurial
utility. Neira and Singhania (2017) argue that a cut in corporate taxes can reduce the
12The effects would heavily depend on assumptions regarding labor supply elasticities. If substitution
effects dominate income effects, a cut in the individual tax rate will increase labor supply, reducing
wages. The direct effect of the decline in wages would be to reduce dynamism. On the other hand,
the equilibrium effects would likely work to increase dynamism.
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startup rate via the entrepreneurial choice channel. Hurst and Pugsley (2011) argue
that for many entrepreneurs, starting a firm is a lifestyle choice. When entrepreneurs
enjoy a fixed utility benefit from running a firm, a cut in the corporate tax rates might
create direct effects even under immediate expensing.
Finally, we have abstracted from financial market imperfections. The cut in tax
rates and the introduction of full expensing might alleviate the impact of such frictions,
creating additional effects.
7 Concluding remarks
The quantitative firm dynamics model indicates that a reform of firm taxation, as in
the TCJA, can trigger a dramatic boost in business dynamism and of economic activity
in general. The increase in dynamism is driven by the indirect effects associated with
the cut in the tax rates. Intuitively, the tax cut increases firm values, which encourages
firm entry. This in turn increases wages, which pushes out more firms that are hit
by adverse productivity shocks. Together, these effects imply an increase in business
dynamism. The magnitude of this increase is large, and in fact large enough to offset
the decline in startup rates observed in the U.S. of the last few decades.
A quantitatively important component of the reform is the cut in the tax rate on
firm profits. Firm entry, and the resulting endogenous number of businesses, is the
key channel through which tax cuts can affect the aggregate economy in our model.
Specifically, because the costs of starting up a business are incurred before the firm is
formally established, they are not tax deductible. A cut in the tax rate raises post-
entry values, but leaves the entry cost unaffected, triggering an increase in firm entry,
boosting dynamism and aggregate output. Our results show that this effect, which is
absent in representative-agent models, can have quantitatively very large implications
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for the effects of tax policies. This contrasts analyses in representative-agent models
in which changes in corporate tax rates tend to have relatively small effects, see e.g.
Barro and Furman (2018). This feature of the model also potentially has important




This part of the Appendix provides proofs for the three propositions in the main text.
Proof of proposition 1. Under immediate expensing, the exit value can be expressed
as V x = (1− τ) Ṽ x, where Ṽ x ≡ (1− δ) k−1 − ψ(0, k−1) is the exit value without the
tax (τ = 0). Note also that after-tax profits of a continuing firm are proportional to
1 − τ . It follows that the firm value is linear and homogeneous in 1 − τ , i.e. it can
be written as V = (1− τ) Ṽ , where Ṽ is the firm value without the tax, but with the
same wage. The choices for k, l and z∗ which maximize Ṽ therefore also maximize V .
Hence, the firms’ decisions are not affected by a change in the tax rate, given a fixed
wage.
Proof of proposition 2. We can write the free entry condition as: ce = (1− τ)EṼ (w),
where Ṽ (w) is again the value of an entrant without a tax, but now expressed explicitly
as a function of the wage w. Ṽ (w) is decreasing in w, since profits and continuation
values are decreasing in w. It follows from the free-entry condition that a decline in τ
must be offset by a decrease in Ṽ (w), and hence an increase in w. The latter reduces
continuation values but does not affect exit values. Therefore, the exit cutoff z∗ must
increase following a decline in τ .
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The expensing rate. Consider a unit of investment made by a firm, j periods before
it exits. The present value of tax deductions obtained from this investment unit is given
by:













This equation directly leads to the expression for λ(j) given in the main text. The final
term is the deduction obtained in the final period, when the firm exits. In this period,
the firm does not produce but generates a before-tax cash flow πx =(1− δ) k−1 −
ψ(0, k−1). In the final period, the firm can deduct (1− δ) k−1 when computing its
taxable income, since this income stream was not generated from the firm’s production
activities, but rather from previous purchases of capital.




(1− δ)t + (1− δ)j = δ1− (1− δ)
j
δ
+ (1− δ)j = 1,
where the second equality follows from the properties of a geometric series.
Proof of proposition 3. We can express the sum all tax payments of a firm over its
lifetime, under gradual expensing, as:
s−1∑
t=0





τπct + τ(1− λ(s− t))it + τπxj ,
where s ≥ 0 is the date at which the firm exits and λ(j) is the expensing rate as defined
in the main text. Since without discounting the expensing rate is unity, the present
value of tax payments under gradual expensing then becomes:
t+s−1∑
u=t









Without discounting, this corresponds precisely to the present value of tax payments
under immediate expensing.
B Tax cuts under immediate expensing
This section shows that as predicted by our Proposition 1 and 2, changing taxes in the
model under immediate expensing impacts the economy only through indirect (general
equilibrium effects). This can be seen from Figure B which uses the baseline calibration
except that it considers immediate expensing already before the reform. The policy
change then reflects only a decrease in the tax rate.13 Clearly, there are no direct
effects of the tax decrease and the policy has an impact on the economy only through
indirect channels operating via firm entry and the labor market.
13We have not re-calibrated the model to match the targets in this case.
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Figure 6: Effects of tax reform: lower taxes under immediate expensing

































after reform: direct only
after reform: overall
Note: the figure shows, by firm age, average exit rates (top left), average firm size
(top right), average capital (bottom left) and average TFP (bottom right). The lines
represent the baseline model (“before reform”), the direct (partial equilibrium) effects
(“after reform: direct only”) and the overall (general equilibrium) effects (“after reform:
overall”). The policy change considered is a tax reduction from τ = 0 .35 to τ = 0 .21 ,
while maintaining immediate expensing.
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